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State courts are often required to enforce federally-created
rights that are silent as to appropriate remedies, and there-
fore, the state court must itself determine an applicable
remedy. In instances where the state court has failed to
provide an, adequate remedy for the federal right, the
United States Supreme Court has required the state court
to grant a specific remedy; the Court, however, has not
established the basis for this result. The author of this
Note examines three possible bases: the remedy is state-
created; the remedy is federally-created; or the Constitu-
tion requires the state to provide an adequate remedy. He
concludes that the constitutionally-required state remedy
theory best accommodates both federal and state interests,
yet secures the effective enforcement of federal rights.
A significant aspect of the American federal system is that the
state courts are regularly employed for the enforcement of federal-
ly-created rights having no necessary correlation with state law.,
In adjudicating substantive rights created by either federal statutes
or the federal constitution, the state courts apply their own pro-
cedural rules2 and to some extent their own remedial concepts,'
1. Congress need not employ state courts for the enforcement of federal
rights, but can instead grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts. The
Constitution provides that "the judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may ... ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See The Moses
Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
2. Central Union Tel. Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190 (1925).
The application of state procedural rules to an action based on a federal
right may preclude consideration of the merits of the federal question and
thus, in effect, deny the federal right. The Supreme Court does not nor-
mally have jurisdiction to review the state court decision, if the procedural
rules are fair and have a sufficient basis at state law. See, e.g., Parker v.
Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935);
Comment, Supreme Court Treatment of State Procedural Grounds Re-
lied on in State Courts To Preclude Decision of Federal Questions, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1961). If the application of the rules is so stringent that
it nullifies the~federal right, however, the Supreme Court will exercise juris-
diction. See NKACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); New
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for generally "federal law takes the state courts as it finds them."'
In addition, federal law is interstitial in nature, building upon
"legal relationships established by the states, altering or supplant-
ing them only so far as necessary for the special purpose."' As
a result, the laws and the Constitution of the United States are fre-
quently silent regarding the remedies available for their contra-
vention, leaving the determination of the applicable remedy to the
courts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has overturned state
court decisions that in effect deny federal rights and has required
the state court to grant a specific remedy where the Court im-
plicitly finds that the vindication of the federal right outweighs
the deference to state remedial concepts.' This poses the prin-
cipal inquiry of this Note-a determination of the basis upon
York Cent. R.R. v. New York & Pa. Co., 271 U.S. 124 (1926); Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
In actions to enforce federal rights over which state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, differences between state and federal
procedural rules may yield different results and induce undesirable forum-
shopping by the litigants. Although a consideration of this problem is beyond
the scope of this Note, a possible solution that would allow the states to re-
tain independence in determining their judicial administration "does not lie
in the sacrifice of the independence of either government. It lies rather
in provision by the federal government, confident of the justice of its own
procedure, of a federal forum equally accessible to both litigants." Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUlM. L. REV.
489, 508 (1954) [hereinafter cited as State and Federal Law].
3. Where a federal right is silent as to a remedy, state law determines
the appropriate remedy; a choice of the wrong remedy is an adequate
state ground and precludes the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946) (coram nobis ap-
propriate post-conviction remedy rather than habeas corpus); McCoy v.
Shaw, 277 U.S. 302 (1928) (payment of tax and suit for refund appropriate
rather than injunction); Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134 (1915)
(administrative remedy appropriate rather than court action). See also
ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES § 103 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951) [hereinafter cited
as ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM].
4. State and Federal Law 508.
5. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 435 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239
(1931); Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920). Contrast
this approach with that of the Supreme Court in post-conviction efforts of
state prisoners alleging that their conviction was in violation of the federal
constitution. The Court has repeatedly said that the states are constitution-
ally obligated to provide adequate post-conviction remedies. See, e.g., Young
v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949); New York ex rel. Whitman v.
Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 690 (1943); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113
(1935); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923). The Court, neverthe-
less, has never compelled a state to grant post-conviction remedies, assuming
instead that the proper relief is by way of federal habeas corpus. See
Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 116 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Young v. Ragen, supra.
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which the Supreme Court can compel a state court to provide a
particular remedy to redress the violation of a federally-created
right.
A principle basic to American federalism is that "if a state court
undertakes to adjudicate a controversy it must do so in accordance
with whatever federal law is applicable."' This is not to say that
the states must provide courts of competent jurisdiction to enforce
a federal rights or even that state courts cannot decline to
adjudicate an action based upon a claim of federal right;' these
problems are not resolved by this principle. Yet once a state court
assumes the adjudication of a cause of action, the supremacy
clause of the Constitution makes clear that the court's judgment
must not conflict with applicable federal law.10 Upon this basis,
if federal law were determined to provide the remedy for a fed-
eral right, the Supreme Court would have the authority to compel
a state to grant that remedy when a state court undertakes to en-
force that right. Similarly, if federal law were determined to re-
quire an adequate state remedy for the federal right, the Supreme
Court could compel the state to grant a remedy sufficient to vindi-
cate the federal right. As a result, the determination of the source
of the remedy as either federal or state is essential.
Underlying the analytical determination of the source of the
remedy, however, is a complex problem inherent with federalism
-the accommodation of federal and state interests. The role of
the state courts in enforcing federal rights itself actuates the com-
plexities of accommodating both federal and state interests within
the structure of federalism; the federal interest of securing the ef-
fective enforcement of federal rights may conflict with the state
interest in remaining an independent, viable political unit able to
direct the objectives of its judicial system. If the Supreme Court
is able to compel state courts to grant a remedy in cases where
no remedy exists at state law, the states' independence is re-
stricted. In light of the states' interest in directing their judicial
systems, when federal law creates rights without specifying reme-
dies, the pre-existence of a system of state remedial law is perhaps
the primary determinant in adjudging whether federal law dis-
places state law or is integrated with it.' Yet counterbalancing
7. State and Federal Law 507.
8. See text accompanying notes 87-88 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 56-61 infra.
10. This principle underlies numerous decisions reversing state courtjudgments for further proceedings in accordance with federal law. See,
e.g., McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411
(1920); Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
11. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
1963]
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these factors is the pre-eminence of federal rights, which perhaps
should not be defeated by state policies, and the co-ordination of
federal law, which requires uniformity in the enforcement of fed-
eral rights.12
A consideration of the leading case of Ward v. Board of
County Comm'rs3 will exemplify the nature of both the federal
and the state interests and will serve as an analytical tool for ex-
amining the alternative sources of the remedy. In this case, an
Oklahoma county levied a tax on land allotted to the Choctaw
Indians and protected from taxation by an act of Congress. The
county collected the tax by threatening to sell the land if the tax
were not paid. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the tax
was unconstitutional, but denied the Choctaw Indians' suit for a re-
fund on the ground that the tax was paid voluntarily and that the
tax receipts had already been dispersed to other governmental
agencies, with the result that under state law there was no rem-
edy.14 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, requiring the county to refund the taxes paid un-
less the state court found that the suit for refund was subject to
the state statute of limitations. The Court reached this result by
overturning the state court's finding that the tax was paid volun-
tarily and by overriding a state rule that dispersion of taxes col-
lected could defeat an action for refund as a violation of federal
law. The Court's opinion did not, however, determine the source
of its authority to require the state to grant the remedy. This Note
examines three possible bases for the decision in the Ward case:
the remedy is state-created; the remedy is federally-created; and
the Constitution requires the state to create the remedy.
I. THE REMEDY IS STATE-CREATED
The Supreme Court's mandate requiring the state court to
grant a particular remedy for a federal right could be based on a
finding by the Court that the remedy exists under state law. Upon
this basis, the Court could determine that existing state law pro-
vides the specific remedy for the asserted right and that the
state court misapplied state law by denying that remedy.
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954).
12. Initially Congress limited the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
to cases in which the state courts had denied federal rights. Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85. Congress extended this jurisdiction to
all causes involving federal rights by the Judiciary Act of 1914, ch. 2, 38
Stat. 790, probably to enable the Court to secure uniformity in the inter-
pretation of federal law. See ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM § 98.
13. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
14. Board of Comm'rs v. Ward, 68 Okla. 287, 173 Pac. 1050 (1918).
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The Ward case, on the issue of a taxpayer's right to recover an
involuntary payment of taxes, is conformable to the state-created
remedy basis. The Supreme Court determined that the state
court's finding of a voluntary payment of the taxes was untenable,
and held that the taxes could be recovered even without a permis-
sive statute, for "the law, independent of any statute, will compel
restitution."' 5 "The law" alluded to apparently was not state, but
federal.' 6 The Supreme Court, however, could have determined
that state law granted restitution of undue taxes that were involun-
tarily paid; therefore, the Court's decision would have required
the state court to grant to the claimants the remedy available at
state law. Moreover, the wording of the Court's mandate, making
the remedy subject to "any valid local law in force when the claim
was filed,"' 7 would be consistent with this analysis.
The application of the state-created remedy basis first re-
quires a determination of whether the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction confers upon it the right to review the state court de-
nial of the remedy. The Court will not exercise jurisdiction if the
state court decision is based on an independent and adequate non-
federal ground."8 Since a decision that state law does not provide
a remedy for an asserted federal right is, by hypothesis, independ-
ent of a federal question, the Court must inquire into the adequacy
of that decision 9 to determine whether the nonfederal ground is
a mere pretext put forward with a purpose of evading federal
15. 253 U.S. at 24. (Emphasis added.)
16. All of the cases that the Court cited as authority for this principle
were cases arising in federal courts. Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107
U.S. 348, 355 (1882); Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1880);
Marsh v. Fulton County, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 676, 684 (1870).
17. 253 U.S. at 25.
18. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Berea Col-
lege v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM§§ 89-103. The Court has indicated that this restriction upon itsjurisdiction derives from the general prohibitions against advisory opinions.
See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-27 (1945).
19. The Court applies its own criteria in determining the adequacy of
the state decision. See, e.g., Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931);
Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); ROBERTsON &
KIRKHAM § 94.
20. See Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920);
Vandalia R.R. v. Indiana ex rel. City of South Bend, 207 U.S. 359 (1907).
This inquiry involves a determination of whether the state court decision
manifests an inconsistent application of state law. NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see Ancient Egyptian Arabic Or-
der v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929) (state court's failure to find laches
reversed as unsupported by the evidence); Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights
of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246 (1912) (same); cf. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. New-
port, 247 U.S. 464 (1918) (res judicata an inadequate state ground);
Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917) (es-
toppel an adequate state ground).
1963] 819
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rights.2" For this purpose, the Court determines the adequacy of
state court findings both of state law and of fact.2" Once the
Court resolves that the state court has, in effect, voided a federal
right by misapplying state remedial law, its appellate jurisdiction
is established, and its mandate will necessarily require the state
court to grant the applicable state-created remedy, absent a de-
termination on remand of a new adequate state ground."2
The Supreme Court has applied this approach to state remedial
law to both federal statutory and constitutional rights. The Court
determined in Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias23
that a state court's failure to find laches, which resulted in the
denial of a federal statutory right, was inadequate. In making
this determination, the Supreme Court expressly applied the same
standard as the state court-the equitable principles of general
law-but concluded that the state court was bound to find laches.
In Brinkerhoff-Faris,4 the state court declined to exercise equityjurisdiction because administrative remedies were available to the
claimant; the Supreme Court determined that the administrative
remedies were illusory and that the failure of the state court to
exercise jurisdiction was thus a denial of due process of law as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
A problem of enforcing the state-created remedy arises, how-
ever, if on remand the state court does not proceed in accordance
with the Supreme Court's mandate. On a claim of deviation from
the mandate, the proper procedure is plainly by appeal or writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court for review of the state court pro-
ceedings under the mandate and for entry of judgment and award
of execution; 5 as long as Supreme Court review is possible,
the alternative remedy of mandamus is unavailable.2" A more dif-
ficult problem arises when the state court on remand fails to enter
final judgment promptly, thus precluding immediate review by the
21. The Supreme Court has determined that its authority to examine
state court findings of law and of fact is implicit in its jurisdiction, con-
ferred by Congress, to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United
States. Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 23 (1920); see
Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912);
ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM § 96.
22. The Supreme Court's mandate will allow the state court to recon-
sider its determination of underlying state law; a reversal, of itself, is not
conclusive of final judgment. See, e.g., Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania,
302 U.S. 506 (1938); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 297 U.S. 620(1936).
23. 225 U.S. 246 (1912): accord, Ancient Egyptian Arabic Order v.
Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929).
24. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
25. This is the Procedure followed in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
26. In re Blake, 175 U.S. 114 (1899).
NOTES
Supreme Court." Although the availability of mandamus is an
open question in such a case," the Supreme Court has the pow-
er to issue a writ of mandamus,29 and the Court has found man-
damus to be proper where no other adequate remedies are avail-
able.3" Disobedience of the writ of mandamus by the state court
may give rise to the sanction of contempt against the state
judges." The usage of a compulsory process like the writ of man-
damus, however, directly interferes with the state judicial process
and enhances the possibility of friction between the state and fed-
eral judiciary. A preferable solution might be for the Supreme
Court, with the broad disposition powers available under the
grant of appellate jurisdiction, to* recall its mandate, enter judg-
ment,32 and enforce the decree by available federal processes.33
27. The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction of state court decisions
only extends to "final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court
of a State in which a decision could be had .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1958).
28. ROBERTSON. & KMIX M § 12; Comment, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 358,
361-65 (1942). In Ex parte Texas, 315 U.S. 8 (1942), the question of
whether the Court has jurisdiction to award mandamus when review is
precluded by the absence of a final judgment was argued, but not decided.
The Supreme Court in dicta has indicated somewhat conflicting views.
A writ of mandamus will not issue to a state court. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816) (concurring opinion). Yet the
statutory authority to issue writs of mandamus to federal courts and offi-
cers includes the authority to issue writs to state officers where mandamus
is issued as a process to enforce judgments. Graham v. Norton, 82 U.S.(15 Wall.) 427, 428 (1872). But see Ohio Oil Co. v. Thompson, 120 F.2d
831, 835 (8th Cir. 1941) (dictum); In re Dowd, 133 Fed. 747, 751 (C.C.D.
Colo. 1904) (dictum).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1958) provides that "the Supreme Court . . .
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respectivejurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." See In re
Dowd, 133 Fed. 747, 751 (C.C.D. Colo. 1904) (dictum): "[Bly virtue of
its appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court of the United States has the
power to issue its writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court of the State of
Colorado . .. .
30. In re Washington & G.R.R., 140 U.S. 91 (1891).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958) provides that "a court of the United States
shall have power to punish . . . such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as . . . disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command." See In re Copenhaver, 54 Fed. 660 (C.C.W.D.
Mo. 1893) (disobedience of a writ of mandamus by county officers a con-
tempt); cf. United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) (state sheriff's
defiance of Supreme Court's order of a stay of execution a contempt).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1958):
the Supreme Court . . . may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or re-
verse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brouaht be-
fore it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of
such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or reauire such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstance.
This should confer upon the Court the power to recall its mandate and
enter judgment.
33. A United States marshal appointed by the Supreme Court pursu-
1963]
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Viewing the remedy as state-created is unsatisfactory, however,
since the remedy would be subject to the state court's determina-
tion of when to invoke it. Clearly the state court could not dis-
criminate against a federal right through its application of state
remedial law,3" but it could invoke only the same remedy as it
would for an analogous state-created right. In fact, a state court's
nondiscriminatory decision not to grant a state remedy would be
an independent and adequate nonfederal ground foreclosing re-
view by the Supreme Court, as the Court has recognized, for ex-
ample, with respect to laches,3" estoppel,36 and statutes of limita-
tion." For this reason, the Ward case is inconsistent with the
state-created remedy basis. In Ward, if the Court's power to re-
quire the state to grant the tax refund were based on the existence
of that remedy at state law, the state court's judgment that dis-
persion of the taxes to other governmental agencies defeated the
refund claim would have been controlling. The result of the state-
created remedy basis, then, is to allow the states to determine the
remedial concepts that their judicial systems will enforce since
the remedies developed for state-created rights are also applied
to analogous federally-created rights. In balance, however, the
federal interest of securing the effective enforcement of federal
rights, without regard to whether the action is instituted in a fed-
eral or a state court, outweighs any deference that federal law
owes to state remedial policies, and federal rights should not be
subject to the existence of a remedy at state law.
A determination that the remedy for federal rights can be
state-created is also unsatisfactory because a federal claim might
then not constitute a cause of action enforceable in federal courts
of original jurisdiction. Under federal question jurisdiction, federal
courts require that to state an enforceable cause of action, a fed-
eral right, whether statutory or constitutional, must be pleaded
and a federal forum must be able to afford a remedy. In de-
ant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 672(a)(c) (1958) "in executing the laws of the United
States within a state, may exercise the same powers which a sheriff of such
state may exercise in executing the laws thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 549 (1958).
34. Cf. McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Second
Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). In McKnett, the Court, rely-
ing on both the privileges and immunities and the full faith and credit
clauses, reasoned that the federal constitution prohibited the states from dis-
criminating against rights arising under federal law. 292 U.S. at 233-34.
35. Utley v. City of St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106 (1934).
36. Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917).
37. Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672 (1913).
38. Where the claimant relies on a federal statutory right that is silent
as to the availability of damages, the federal courts have dismissed a suit
for damages on its merits, holding that federal law failed to provide the
remedy. See Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del. 1946), a/I'd on
NOTES
termining whether a federal court has the power to award the de-
sired remedy, the Supreme Court has not employed existing state-
created remedies, but has only considered whether federal law it-
self provides the remedy.39 Therefore, an action instituted in a
federal court based upon a federal right for which neither fed-
eral statute nor the federal common law provides a remedy would
be dismissed upon the merits, 0 even though state law provides a
remedy for that federal right. Litigants claiming under a federal
right, however, should have access to a federal forum to provide
a means of avoiding state hindrance of federal rights without sacri-
ficing the independence of either system.41 In practice, apparent-
ly, federal courts are easily satisfied that there is a federal rem-
edy, finding that the remedy either arises by implication from the
federal right or exists under "general principles of the law.14
Such a practice makes available a federal forum to most federal
claimants, albeit in an arbitrary way. But allowing federal and
state courts each to determine the proper remedy for a given fed-
eral right creates an incentive for forum-shopping between federal
other grounds, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1947); cf. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). With respect to constitutional
rights, however, the federal courts have distinguished between claims seek-
ing money damages, where they determined that federal law lacked the
remedy, and claims seeking preventive relief, where they have granted a
federal remedy. Compare Viles v. Symes, 129 F.2d 828 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 633 (1942) (alleged violation of the first, fifth, and sixth
amendments); Taylor v. De Hart, 22 F.2d 206 (W.D. Mo. 1926), appeal
dismissed, 274 U.S. 726 (1927) (alleged violation of the fourth amend-
ment), with Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920) (injunction against
legislation impairing the obligation of contracts); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) (suppression of evidence to protect rights under the
fourth amendment). See generally Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for
Damages Under Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUM. L. REv.
1090 (1948).
39. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), where the Supreme Court
determined that a federal court had original federal question jurisdiction
to consider whether it could grant money damages to vindicate alleged
violations of the fourth and fifth amendments; the Court concluded that
the power to grant the money recovery depended upon an interpretation
of federal law, and it failed to consider the possibility of a state-created
remedy conferring this power upon the federal courts.
40. See id. at 682. The Court stated that "it is well settled that
the failure to state a proper cause of action [because the federal right
fails to afford a remedy] calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a
dismissal for want of jurisdiction."
41. This is the same solution that was suggested to remedy material
differences in procedural law affecting federal rights. See note 2 supra.
42. See, e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S.
210 (1944); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Gold-
stein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
43. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
19631
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and state courts sitting in the same state. Clearly, then, if the Su-
preme Court determines that the remedy for a federal right is state-
created, it should also require that federal courts employ the state-
created remedy in enforcing federal rights silent as to a remedy;
only then can the litigant claiming under a federal right be assur-
ed of access to a federal forum yet be prevented from forum-
shopping.
II. THE REMEDY IS FEDERALLY-CREATED
A. STATUTORY RIGHTS
When a federal statute creates rights and duties without provid-
ing express vinication for their breach,44'a state court denial of
a federal statutory right could be overturned and a remedy granted
by the Supreme Court on the basis that the remedy is federally-
created because it arises by implication from the statute. Whether
Congress in such a situation intends the remedy to be supplied by
state law or assumes that the remedies will be determined by the
independent judgment of the federal courts in the exercise of their
grant of original federal question jurisdiction is unclear. Congress
has not clarified this question,45 and its resolution has been left
to the judiciary.
In approaching the question of which system, federal or state, is
to supply the remedial gloss, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between equitable and legal remedies. In Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht,"6 the Court made it clear that if an equitable remedy were
sought to redress a federal right, then the federal courts would
formulate the remedial details. Where a legal remedy is desired,
however, there may be more uncertainty as to which system is to
supply the remedy.4" The Court's basis for such a distinction is
44. See, e.g., Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C.§§ 791a-828 (1958) (statute fails to mention damages remedy); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1958) (stat-
ute provides damages remedy for violations of certain sections, but is silent
as to the availability of such a remedy for violations of others). See Mon-
tana Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwest Pub. Serv. Co., 73 F. Supp. 149
(D.S.D. 1947); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.
N.Y. 1941).
45. Congress could do so with a general enabling statute granting to the
federal courts the power to afford all remedies necessary to vindicate fed-
eral substantive rights. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision
of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 241-42 (1948);
Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1095 (1948).
46. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
47. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), where the Supreme Court
held that the federal courts had federal question jurisdiction to determine




that Congress must have intended that federal equitable rights,
which require flexible remedies to be adequately vindicated, should
be redressed by remedies created by federal courts,"' while with
federal legal rights, which can be satisfactorily vindicated within
the established. confines of state law, Congress intended to adopt
the applicable state remedies.49 It would seem, however, that the
federal interest of effectively vindicating federally-created rights
through flexible remedies" requires the federal judiciary, in the
absence of direction from Congress, to assume this duty whether
equitable or. legal remedies are sought." Moreover, since the
authority to supply the remedial gloss for federal rights would lie
in the grant by Congress of federal question jurisdiction, the alle-
gation of the federal right itself would constitute a valid cause of
action enforceable in the federal courts. As a result of this ap-
proach, the federal judiciary would assume the duty of providing
remedies for federal rights, and the state courts, when enforcing
federal statutory rights, would look to federal common-law reme-
dies to determine the applicable remedy. Upon this basis, the Su-
preme Court could plainly determine the particular federal remedy
that arises by implication from the federal statute.
The Ward case, if analyzed in terms of this approach, is indica-
tive of a remedy arising by implication from a federal statute. The
act of Congress in Ward provided that the Choctaw Indians' land
would be nontaxable. The Supreme Court might have determined
that the remedy for recovery of taxes was implicit in the federal
Analytically, the legal-equitable dichotomy as discussed is not complete.
An action, such as a stockholder's derivative suit, may be instituted in equity
even though legal relief is pleaded. In Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461
(1947), the Court applied the state statute of limitations to such a suit in
equity, reasoning that "equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the
applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy." Id.
at 464; see HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 695.
48. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1946). Appar-
ently the promulgation of the new federal rules, abolishing the distinction
between law and equity, left the federal equitable remedies unaffected. See
Federal and State Law 511.
49. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1946); cf. Board
of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50, 351-52
(1939).
50. "[W]here -federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their reme-
dies so as to grant the necessary relief." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946).
51. Professor Wechsler advocates a general enabling statute in favor of
the federal courts as a solution. "In neither case [equitable nor legal rem-
edies], however, should the answer be left merely to an implication; nor
should the states provide the governing rule-unless the Congress has made
clear in the particular area an intention to refer questions of remedies to
state law." Wechsler, supra note 45, at 241. (Emphasis added.)
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statute creating immunity from taxation; hence, this equitable
remedy would have been of federal origin, and the Court would
have the jurisdiction to consider and the authority to grant it. Yet,
this analysis seemingly does not conform with the mandate in
Ward allowing the state statute of limitations to defeat the federal
right. Analytically, such statutes should be treated similarly to
remedial details, for the underlying consideration is the same-
whether state law is to be absorbed as the governing federal rule.
If state law is absorbed, it does not operate of its own force, but
is incorporated by Congress, either expressly or impliedly, as part
of the federal law.52 Absent direction by Congress, it is the duty
of the federal courts to establish the governing federal rule;"3 the
courts have assumed this duty on an ad hoc basis, absorbing state
law if the codified state interests are not considered inconsistent
with federal policy.' For this reason, the suggested rationale for
Ward-that federal common law provides the remedy, but ab-
sorbs the state statute of limitations-is not inconsistent with the
mandate in that case.55
Even assuming that the remedy arises by implication from the
statute, whether a state court would be constitutionally bound to
enforce the federal right is unclear. State courts, however, may
voluntarily enforce federal rights.56 Of course, once a state court
undertakes to adjudicate a cause of action, the supremacy clause
requires that it do so in accordance with whatever federal law is
52. The process of absorption is not attributable to the law-making
agencies of the state, but is "ultimately attributable to the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States . . . ." Board of County Comm'rs
v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939). The absorption of state
law is premised upon a recognition of state interests; the Court may de-
termine state law to be absorbed where state interests are not considered
inconsistent with federal policy and absent "explicit legislative policy cutting
across state interests .... " Id. at 352.
53. The Court has candidly recognized that "in absence of an applica-
ble Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
rule of law according to their own standards." Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
54. With respect to state statutes of limitation, for example, the Court,
in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), held that the statute did
not defeat the federal equitable right, but in Benedict v. New York, 250
U.S. 321 (1919), it held that the state statute became the applicable fed-
eral rule. See Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1953); Note, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (1953).
55. Especially with respect to state statutes of limitation, federal law has
consistently absorbed the applicable state statute. See, e.g., Cope v. An-
derson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154 (1905);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d
136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947). See also Note, Federal
Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1953).
56. See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
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applicable; the question of enforcement arises only when the state
court declines to adjudicate the federal right.57 Until recently,
Congress was not considered capable of requiring a state to en-
force a federal right unless the right was nonpenal in nature "
and the state enforced analogous forum-created rights. 9 In Testa
v. Katt,11 the Court assumed that a federal right was penal, yet
nonetheless held that the state court must enforce it. In so hold-
ing, the Court used reasoning broad enough to imply that a state
is constitutionally obligated to enforce all federally-created
rights.6 Relying on the supremacy clause, the Court reasoned
that an act of Congress established the policy for all; therefore, a
contravening state policy cannot exist to justify a state court's re-
fusal to adjudicate a federal right. As a practical matter, since
the remedy is federally-created, the federal courts are available to
the litigant by their federal question jurisdiction, thus somewhat
alleviating the hardship that results if the state court declines to
adjudicate.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Several Supreme Court decisions compelling a state court to
grant a remedy are consistent with the approach that the Constitu-
tion creates both the right and the remedy. In Iowa-Des Moines
Nat'l Bank v. Bennett,62 the Court granted a tax refund to the
claimant upon finding that the collection of the tax was in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Reversing the state court's decision63 that the claimant's remedy
57. See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
58. This distinction was apparently based on the conflict-of-laws rule
that one sovereign cannot enforce the penal statutes of another. See
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672-74 (1892); The Antelope, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
59. Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); see McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
60. 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see Note, State Enforcement of Federally Cre-
ated Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551, 1554-56 (1960).
61. The Court reasoned that:
So far as the question of whether the Rhode Island courts properly de-
clined to try this action, it makes no difference into which of these
categories [penal or nonpenal] the Rhode Island court chose to place
the statute which Congress has passed. For we cannot accept the basic
premise on which the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it
has no more obligation to enforce a valid penal law of the United
States than it has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign
country. Such a broad assumption flies in the face of the fact that the
States of the Union constitute a nation. It disregards the purpose and
effect of Article VI of the Constitution [the supremacy clause] ....
330 U.S. at 389.
62. 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
63. Iowa Nat'1 Bank v. Stewart, 214 Iowa 1229, 232 N.W. 445 (1930).
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was to await the exaction of a higher tax from its competitors,
the Supreme Court apparently determined that the fourteenth
amendment conferred the right to a refund.64 Similarly, the Court
in Poindexter v. Greenhow"5 found that the constitutional provi-
sion prohibiting state impairment of the obligation of contracts
conferred upon the claimant the right to recover property dis-
trained by the state in violation of the state's contract with the
claimant.
The Ward case is also analytically consistent with the constitu-
tionally-created remedy basis. The Court declared that for a state
to use coercion in the collection of taxes without incurring an ob-
ligation to repay them would be an appropriation of property
without due process of law in contravention of the fourteenth
amendment.66 Arguably, the fourteenth amendment created the
remedy of repayment coexistently with the right to protection from
the taking of property without due process of law. While this argu-
ment would not seem to explain the Court's mandate subjecting
the remedy to the state statute of limitations, in fact, state law
could be absorbed as the governing federal law since the state in-
terest is not inconsistent with federal policy.
Adoption of the approach that the Constitution creates the rem-
edy results in several desirable ramifications. If the Constitution
creates the remedy as well as the right, then the federal claim
would clearly constitute a cause of action enforceable in the fed-
eral courts; this makes available to the federal claimant a sympa-
thetic tribunal and allows the litigants to avoid a potentially re-
calcitrant state court." In addition, although there are situations
in which it is unclear whether a state court is constitutionally ob-
ligated to enforce federal statutory rights," a proper accommo-
dation of federal and state interests does not preclude the state
64. With respect to the remedy, the Court stated:
The petitioners' rights were violated, and the causes of action arose,
when taxes at the lower rate were collected from their competitors
.... *The right invoked is that to equal treatment; and such treat-
ment will be attained if either their competitors' taxes are increased
or their own reduced. But it is well settled that a taxpayer who has
been subjected to discriminatory taxation through the favoring of oth-
ers in violation of federal law, cannot be required himself to assume
the burden of seeking an increase of the taxes which the others
should have paid.
284 U.S. at 247.
65. 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
66. 253 U.S. at 24.
67. Unless prohibited by Congress, any civil action brought in a state
court can be removed by the defendant to the federal district court if that
court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1958).
68. See notes 56-61 supra and accompanying text.
courts from being bound to enforce constitutionally-created rights
and remedies. The broad reasoning of Testa v. Katt6 should as-
sure that state courts are required to enforce constitutional rights
even though the remedies granted are in fact supplied by a proc-
ess of federal judicial legislation.
Although the results of this approach are appealing, a determi-
nation that the Constitution itself creates remedies is conceptually
difficult. The prohibitions embodied in the Constitution, especial-
ly those protecting individuals from abusive state action, create
remedies mainly in a protective sense.70 Granting positive reme-
dies where state action is prohibited also introduces competing
public interests-allowing money damages might discourage good
faith official action,' while preventive relief entails danger of
undue influence over state governmental processes.' Nonethe-
less, injunctive relief is treated as being conferred directly by the
Constitution.7" In the absence of an act of Congress, compensa-
tory damages for violation of a constitutional right, however, have
not been recognized by the federal courts.74 Obviously, the Con-
stitution does not uniformly create remedies for the infringement
of constitutional rights. Instead, each controversy based on a con-
stitutional right requires a balancing of competing interests, a func-
tion best performed by the judicial system. The judicially-develop-
ed remedial law in this area may be supplemented and revised con-
siderably -by congressional enactments authorized by express
69. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933), where the
full faith and credit clause was held to require the South Carolina courts
to give effect to the defense recognized in Georgia.
71. Official immunity from actions for damages applies clearly to judges
exercising good faith. E.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). Perhaps this im-
munity can be extended to officers who must exercise discretion in making
judgments. Cf. Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,337 U.S. 925 (1949) (classification by draft board). It does not extend to a
ministerial officer even when acting in good faith. See Tracy v. Swartwout,
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1215-24 (1953).
72. Id. at 843-90; State and Federal Law 523 n.121.
73. See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304-06
(1952); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
704 (1949).
74. See Viles v. Symes, 129 F.2d 828 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
633 (1942); Taylor v. De Hart, 22 F.2d 206 (W.D. Mo. 1926), appeal dis-
missed for lack of juris., 274 U.S. 726 (1927). Mr. Justice Black's opinion
in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), recognized, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, the vossibility of a federal court granting compensatory damages to
vindicate the violation of a constitutional right. This result was rejected on
remand. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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enabling clauses,75 or by the implied powers of Congress.7" This
factor seemingly would refute the contention that the Constitution
itself creates the remedies to vindicate its violation. Moreover,
since constitutional rights are often complexly integrated with
existing state law and since some constitutional rights are defined
in terms of rights that the states themselves have created,77 state
interests may be better accommodated by state court creation of
the remedies.
III. THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES
THE STATE TO CREATE THE REMEDY
The Supreme Court could compel a state court to grant a rem-
edy on the basis that the Constitution requires state courts to create
remedies adequate to vindicate federally-created rights. The states
are free to grant such remedies as they choose for violations of
federal rights if the remedies do not conflict with any provision of
federal law."8 The argument that the states are compelled by the
Constitution to provide adequate remedies for federal rights finds
its basis in the supremacy clause; federal law, both constitutional
and statutory, is integrated into the law of each state through the
purview of that clause, and the state courts may not choose to dis-
regard it."9 Yet superseding this analytical argument is a con-
sideration of the basic relationship of federal substantive law to
state law in American federalism; federal law either displaces state
law or accepts state authority in an area and seeks simply to regu-
late its exercise.8" If the Constitution is deemed to require ade-
quate state-created remedies for federal rights, federal law per-
forms another function-compelling state courts to originate con-
cepts not existing at, and perhaps rejected by, state law.
The Supreme Court in General Oil Co. v. Crain" indicated
75. E.g., the full faith and credit clause provides that Congress shall
prescribe methods of proving judicial proceedings to which states must give
full faith and credit, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; the fourteenth amendment
provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
76. See CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A
SWORD 23-24 (1947).
77. The existence of a property interest falling within the due process
clause is a question of state law. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
321 U.S. 36 (1944). Similarly, the establishment of a valid contract that
cannot be impaired under the constitutional prohibition on the impairment
of contracts is also a question of state law. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
78. See State and Federal Law 523.
79. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); ci. General Oil Co. v. Crain,
209 U.S. 211 (1908); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
80. See State and Federal Law 495.
81. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
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support of this approach. Tennessei law forbade Tennessee courts
from exercising jurisdiction over the particular claim raised in the
Crain case. The Supreme Court, though dismissing the appeal on
its merits, concluded that the state courts were required to grant
jurisdiction to protect the federal constitutional right involved. In
reaching this result, the Court relied on the theoretical basis of
Poindexter v. Greenhow5 2 that the Constitution and federal laws in
accordance with it are the law of the state by virtue of the suprem-
acy clause. Furthermore, the Ward case may authorize this ap-
proach. The language of that opinion perhaps indicates that the
fourteenth amendment compelled the state court to create an ade-
quate remedy to avoid violating the due process clause." More-
over, it is not inconsistent with this basis to remand the cause sub-
ject to the state statute of limitations.
The adoption of this basis might preclude a federal court
from considering the cause on its merits. Original federal question
jurisdiction must be established by what is properly pleaded in
the complaint," which excludes improperly anticipated defenses.$
Federal jurisdiction will thus be precluded in an action based on
state remedial law if dependent upon federal questions that cannot
be immediately raised, such as the federal claimant's constitution-
al guarantee of an adequate state remedy."6
Although original federal jurisdiction might be foreclosed as a
result of this approach, the federal claimant would not be deprived
of a forum competent to adjudge his claim, for the state courts
would be obligated to enforce the federal right. A recognition that
the Constitution requires the states to create remedies for federal
rights, based as it is upon the supremacy clause establishing fed-
eral law as the law of the state, would resolve a fortiori that the
states are under a constitutional obligation to provide courts of
competent jurisdiction to enforce federal rights. The Court recog-
nized in Testa v. Katts? that the supremacy clause clearly requires
the states to enforce federal rights if they enforce analogous forum-
82. 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
83. In finding the state court obligated to refund the taxes, the Supreme
Court reasoned that:
To say that the county could collect these unlawful taxes by coercive
means and not incur any obligation to pay them back is nothing short
of saying that it could take or appropriate the property of these Indian
allottees arbitrarily and without due process of law. Of course this
would be in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
253 U.S. at 24.
84. See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
85. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
86. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673
(1930).
87. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
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created rights.88 If, however, the supremacy clause is deemed to
require the state courts to create remedies for federal rights, the
supremacy clause must necessarily also require the state courts
to provide jurisdiction competent to enforce federal rights.
The solution that the Constitution requires the states to create
a remedy embodies a minor question of appellate jurisdiction
since the Supreme Court cannot review a state court decision based
on a nonfederal ground, such as the applicable state remedy."9
Yet, since the state remedy is required by the Constitution to be
adequate to vindicate a constitutional right, this necessarily raises
a "substantial federal question" sufficient to confer appellate ju-
risdiction upon the Court.9" The prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment raise another possibility for review of the state court
judgment. The guarantee of due process is addressed generally to
the entire scope of state judicial authority.9 As a result, the Su-
preme Court has reviewed a state court decision because it failed
to provide a judicial remedy for violation of a federal right and
the administrative remedies provided were inadequate.2 This
same reasoning would confer appellate jurisdiction upon the Su-
preme Court if a state judicial system failed to provide courts of
competent jurisdiction to enforce federal rights.
A state-created remedy that is required by the Constitution ac-
commodates both federal and state interests. By allowing the states
to formulate their own remedies to vindicate federal rights adjudi-
cated in state courts, the states are able, to a large extent, to control
the objectives of their judicial system. At the same time, the fed-
eral interest of securing the enforcement of federal rights is satis-
fied, without sacrificing the independence of the states, through
the Supreme Court's power to determine the adequacy of the
state remedy. Moreover, the determination that states must provide
competent courts to enforce federal rights does not seriously con-
travene any legitimate state interest. Since the supremacy clause
vitiates state policy considerations as a basis for declining to en-
force federal rights, the only significant state interest is in the in-
creased number of cases the state would be required to adjudicate.
Since federal rights are integrated into state law by the supremacy
88. The fact that the state court enforced analogous state-created rights
was not contested in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The Court, how-
ever, used reasoning broad enough to go beyond that test. See note 61 stu-
pra.
89. See ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM §§ 89-103.
90. Id. § 58.
91. See State and Federal Law 518.
92. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
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clause, however, it is not for the state to complain about the num-
ber of controversies arising within its boundaries.
CONCLUSION
The objectives of federalism require a determination of the
source of remedies for federal rights in order to secure their ef-
fective enforcement while according proper recognition to the state
interests involved. A determination that the remedy is state-created
is unsatisfactory because it subjects the federal right to the state
court's judgment of when to invoke a remedy and thus fails to as-
sure enforcement of the federal right. A decision either that the
remedy is federally-created or that the Constitution requires an
adequate state-created remedy, however, would be in accordance
with these objectives.
A federally-created remedy affords the effective enforcement of
the federal right since a sympathetic tribunal would create the ap-
plicable remedy and its judgment would be subject to Supreme
Court review; the state courts would then also be bound to apply
this remedy. Furthermore, this basis permits Supreme Court re-
view for the purpose of establishing uniform remedies throughout
the United States. Moreover, if the states were determined capable
of declining to adjudicate a federal right where the enforcement
of the federal right would contravene state policy, state interests
would be accommodated.
Likewise, if the Court were to determine that the Constitution
requires an adequate state-created remedy, the federal right would
be assured of being vindicated since the Supreme Court would
have appellate jurisdiction to. consider the adequacy of the rem-
edy. By allowing state courts to formulate the remedies within the
guidelines of "adequacy" as established by the Supreme Court,
this approach would clearly accommodate the state interest in con-
trolling the objectives of their judicial systems. This source of the
remedy, however, would not provide for national uniformity of
remedies for a federal right.
Although both of these remedies satisfy the objectives of feder-
93. Historically, it seems clear that the Constitution was intended to re-
quire the states to enforce federal rights. A major weakness of the Articles
of Confederation was the lack of state enforcement of federal laws. See 14
U. CH. L. REV. 287, 289 (1947). In addition, the decision to grant Con-
gress the power to create lower federal courts was made after the first dis-
cussion of the supremacy clause. 3 FARRAND, THE RECoRDs OF THE FEDER-
AL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 287 (1911). This fact and the fact that Congress
need not exercise its power to create federal courts indicate that without
state enforcement of federal laws, there is no assurance that federal laws
would be enforced if the states are not required to enforce them. See Note,
73 HARV. L. REv. 1551, 1556 (1960).
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alism, the constitutionally-required state remedy would seem to
be most satisfactory in balance. Since Congress has the power to
enact remedies for both constitutional and statutory federal rights,
a Supreme Court determination that the remedy is federally-cre-
ated would amount to legislation by the Court overriding a possible
congressional intention that state remedies should be applied. Fur-
thermore, the federal remedy basis does not necessarily accommo-
date state interests since the federal right that the state court
would decline to adjudicate as contrary to its policies may be
enforced by a federal court sitting within the same state; instead,
states would be allowed to shift the burden of adjudicating certain
federal rights to the federal courts. It would seem, therefore, that
the constitutionally-required state remedy approach best recog-
nizes the state courts as co-ordinate organs of authority in the dis-
charge of the constitutional functions of the states, while still pro-
viding for adequate vindication of federal rights.
